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HE Texas Supreme Court again addressed many basic issues of
tort law during this Survey period, including whether a "publica-
tion as whole" can be defamatory, what is "extreme and outra-
geous" conduct by a business manager, and several important limitations
issues. The boundaries of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improve-
ment Act ("MLIIA") and governmental immunity were frequently liti-
gated, and several cases addressed whether selective disclosure of




In the case of Lions Eye Bank of Texas v. Perry, the court addressed a
claim for negligence and gross negligence arising from the donation of a
dead body's eyes to an eye bank without the consent of the family.1 The
court recognized that there is no general legal duty to avoid the negligent
infliction of mental anguish.2 It then found no "special relationship" be-
tween the deceased's relatives and the eye bank that would allow recov-
ery for mental anguish damages, noting that such cases have three
common elements: (1) a contractual relationship between the parties; (2)
a particular susceptibility to emotional distress on the part of the plaintiff;
and (3) the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's particular susceptibil-
ity to the emotional distress based on the circumstances. 3 Without a con-
tractual relationship, the plaintiffs could not establish a mental anguish
claim. Additionally, they could not recover as bystanders because they
did not witness the actual eye removal. 4 A dissent argued that Texas
courts have consistently allowed recovery of mental anguish damages for
the negligent handling of a dead body. 5
The case of Montes v. Pendergrass arose from a collision when a car
attempted to pass a tractor-trailer rig.6 A threshold issue was whether
* Partner, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, L.L.P.
** Associate, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, L.L.P. The authors ac-
knowledge the able assistance of Charlene Bond.
1. 56 S.W.3d 872 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. filed).
2. Id. at 875 (citing Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993)).
3. Id. at 877 (citing Johnson v. Standard Fruit & Vegetable Co., 984 S.W.2d 633, 638
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 985 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. 1998)).
4. Id. at 878.
5. Id. at 879 (Seymore, J., dissenting).
6. 61 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
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"sole proximate cause" was an affirmative defense. The court noted that
this doctrine is limited to circumstances in which the evidence shows a
third person's conduct, not the conduct of any of the parties to the law-
suit, is the sole proximate cause of the occurrence.7 Therefore, a claim of
sole proximate cause is a challenge to the causation element of the plain-
tiff's claim, not an affirmative defense. The case went on to find fact is-
sues about whether the plaintiff had kept a proper lookout and whether
the failure to keep a proper lookout was the proximate cause of an
accident.8
The case of Trans America Holding v. Market-Antiques & Home Fur-
nishings addressed whether a res ipsa loquitur instruction was required in
a negligence case. 9 The parties did not dispute that the instrumentality
causing the fire at issue was under the defendant's sole management and
control. The issue was whether the fire was the sort of accident that oc-
curs only with negligence. The focus in that type of inquiry is on the
nature of the injury rather than the conduct of the defendant. 10 While
the evidence showed that negligence may have occurred, the court did
not find that it established the character of the fire to be such that it
would occur only with negligence, and, therefore, held that it was not an
abuse of discretion to decline giving the instruction.11 The court noted
that a "circumstantial evidence" instruction may often suffice in place of
a res ipsa loquitur instruction. 12
B. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
In a nursing home negligence case, the court of appeals in Pack v.
Crossroads, Inc. held that the Medical Liability and Insurance Improve-
ment Act (MLIIA)13 does not authorize negligence per se claims based
on a breach of the MLIIA.14 Because expert testimony is required to
prove a cause of action under the MLIIA, it would not be appropriate to
allow an inference of negligence without such testimony. 15
In Cobb v. Dallas Fort Worth Medical Center - Grand Prairie, a plaintiff
sought to hold a hospital strictly liable for providing an allegedly defec-
tive set of surgical screws for an operation.16 Because the hospital was
not in the business of selling this equipment to the public, or otherwise
7. Id. at 508 (citing Am. Jet, Inc. v. Leyendecker, 683 S.W.2d 121, 126 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1984, no writ)).
8. Id. at 510-11; see also Buls v. Fuselier, 55 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001,
no pet.) (discussing treatment of inferential rebuttal issues such as sole proximate cause
and new and independent cause).
9. 39 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
10. Id. at 649.
11. Id. at 649-50.
12. Id. at 650 (quoting Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 256 (Tex. 1974)).
13. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.01 et seq. (Vernon 2002 Cumulative An-
nual Pocket Part).
14. 53 SW.3d 492 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. filed).
15. Id. at 509.
16. 48 S.W.3d 820, 826 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
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providing it outside of its primary purpose of providing medical facilities,
the court held that the claims were inseparable from the services ren-
dered by the hospital, requiring judgment for the defendant as a matter of
law.' 7
In the case of Bush v. Green Oaks Operator, Inc., the trial court dis-
missed the plaintiff's case because she failed to file an expert report
within 180 days after filing suit as required by the MLIIA. The plaintiff
contended that her lawsuit was not a healthcare liability claim but was
based on common law negligence and premises liability, as it arose from
an attack upon her by a fellow patient.' 8 The court of appeals concluded
that the claim did not arise under the Act, as she was not contending that
the hospital breached a standard of care owed to her as a patient but
rather that she was harmed by the unsafe condition created at the hospi-
tal.19 A dissent argued that this was simply an attempt to recast a claim
for inappropriate medical treatment of the dangerous inmate as a com-
mon law claim.20
The plaintiff in Ponce v. El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd. argued that
her claim was not subject to the MLIIA because the Act's definition of a
"healthcare provider" does not include physical or occupational ther-
apists within its scope.21 Acknowledging that the plaintiff was correct
about the list of professionals in the statute, the court nevertheless af-
firmed the trial court's summary judgment, noting that a claim against an
"employee" or "agent" of a healthcare provider was expressly allowed by
the statute.22 The court went on to find that the cause of action was a
"healthcare liability claim" within the meaning of the statute because it
was based upon an alleged departure from accepted standards of medical
care. It involved "healthcare" because the physical therapy at issue was
prescribed by her physician following surgery and was conducted accord-
ing to that prescribed treatment.23
What constitutes a healthcare liability claim was also addressed in
Gomez v. Matey.24 The plaintiff claimed that her doctor recommended
and performed a hysterectomy that he knew she did not need. 25 After
the plaintiff failed to file an expert report within 180 days of filing suit,
the trial court dismissed her suit.26 To determine whether a claim is based
on a breach of the accepted standard of care and thus falls within the
MLIIA, a court must determine whether the plaintiff must prove a
17. Id. at 827.
18. 39 S.W.3d 669, 671 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.).
19. Id. at 672-73.
20. Id. at 673 (Dodson, J., dissenting).
21. 55 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, pet. denied).
22. Id. at 37 (citing Henry v. Premier Healthstaff, 22 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2000, no pet.)).
23. Id. at 39 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §1.03(a)(2) & (4)).
24. 55 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).
25. Id. at 733-34.
26. Id. at 734 (citing TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(i), § 13.01(e)).
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breach of the accepted standard of care. 27 The court found that, regard-
less of the plaintiff's artful pleading, to prove misdiagnosis-even pur-
poseful misdiagnosis-plaintiff must rely on medical expertise to prove a
deviation from the accepted standard of medical care.28
The plaintiff in Martinez v. Battelle Memorial Institute argued that she
could state a claim for "ordinary negligence" and thereby avoid the provi-
sions of the MLIIA.2 9 Defendants argued that all of plaintiff's negligence
claims required proof of the standard of care for diagnosis and care by an
appropriate medical expert, thus bringing them within the statute.30
Plaintiff relied upon the case of Rogers v. Crossroads Nursing Service,31
which involved a claim arising from the negligent placement of a heavy
supply bag that fell on the plaintiff. The court agreed with defendant's
characterization of the claims, finding that the standard of care could not
be measured by the common knowledge of a lay juror, even though they
nominally dealt with such matters as failure to properly enforce certain
internal guidelines. 32
In Neal-Moreno v. Kittrell, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that
when a doctor has a continuing duty to care for a patient, the patient's
malpractice cause of action accrues on the date of the patient's last exam-
ination. 33 In Kittrell, a doctor failed to diagnose cervical cancer after the
patient received an abnormal pap smear following the birth of her child.
The court rejected the doctor's argument that the cause of action accrued
when the doctor first performed the pap smear. Rather, the court held
that because the doctor continued to see the patient, the cause of action
did not accrue until the patient's last visit, at which time the doctor did
not follow up on the abnormal pap smear and did not discover the pa-
tient's cervical cancer.34
In another case involving the expert reports required by the MLIIA,
the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendants was affirmed
after the court found that the plaintiff's expert affidavit was not made in
good faith.35 The statute requires the report to include the expert's opin-
ions about the applicable standard of care, how the care failed to meet
that standard, and causation. 36 The court found that the plaintiff's expert
report failed to represent a good faith effort because the expert's affidavit
failed to identify the appropriate standard of care, failed to inform of the
manner in which the doctor had failed to meet the standard of care, and
offered no insight into the causal relationship between the breach and the
27. See id.
28. Id. at 735.
29. 41 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).
30. Id. at 691.
31. 13 S.W.3d 417, 418 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).
32. Martinez, 41 S.W.3d at 692.
33. 52 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. abated).
34. Id. at 785.
35. Hightower v. Saxton, 54 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.) (citing TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 13.01(d), (e), (1)).
36. Id. at 384.
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injury. Citing the Texas Supreme Court in American Transitional Care
Centers v. Palacious, the court noted that "[a] report that merely states
the expert's conclusions about the standard of care, breach, and causation
does not fulfill" the statute.37
The existence of a physician-patient relationship between a neurologist
and an emergency room patient was addressed in Lection v. Dyll.38 The
plaintiff was taken to an emergency room with symptoms of slurred
speech and dizziness. The physician on duty examined the plaintiff and
paged the neurologist on call, who then telephoned the physician on duty.
The timing of that call and the plaintiff's discharge from the emergency
room was disputed. 39 Soon after discharge, the plaintiff suffered a dis-
abling stroke. The neurologist contended that he had no physician-pa-
tient relationship with the plaintiff and that the phone call between the
two doctors did not create a duty. The court noted that a physician-pa-
tient relationship requires neither the formalities of a contract nor that
the physician deal directly with the patient. Additionally, an on-call phy-
sician to an emergency room can assume a duty to the patient if he takes
some affirmative action to treat the patient.40 The court ultimately found
that, given the dispute about when the plaintiff left the hospital, there was
a fact issue as to whether the plaintiff was an emergency patient when the
phone call occurred, making summary judgment improper.41 The court
also found a fact issue as to whether the defendant took affirmative acts
of treatment. 42
In the case of Simmons v. Healthcare Centers of Texas, the court held
that the 75-day tolling provision available under the MLIIA to a plaintiff
who files the appropriate notice before the end of the 2-year limitation
period is still available in full.43 Thus, when notice is provided under sec-
tion 4.01(a) of the Act,44 the claimant has two years and seventy-five days
in which to file a claim.45
In Roberts v. Williamson, the Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed
the sufficiency of evidence in a jury award of $600,000 for medical ex-
penses that the plaintiff would incur after the age of eighteen. 46 In that
case, parents sued two physicians who treated their newborn child who
suffered brain injuries from oxygen deprivation. During trial, there was
evidence about the medical expenses incurred to treat the child and her
37. Id. (citing Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873 (Tex.
2001)).
38. 65 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied).
39. Id. at 700.
40. Id. at 705.
41. Id. at 707.
42. Id.
43. 55 S.W.3d 674, 680 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
44. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 4.01.
45. Simmons, 55 S.W.3d at 677 (citing DeCheca v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp. Inc., 852
S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex. 1993)).
46. 52 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. filed).
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anticipated medical expenses until she turned eighteen. 47 No evidence
was presented concerning what the likely future medical expenses would
be after the child turned eighteen. The jury awarded $600,000 for medi-
cal expenses incurred and likely to be incurred until the child turned eigh-
teen and an additional $600,000 in medical expenses likely to be incurred
after the child turned eighteen. The court found that the jury is allowed
to consider pre-age-eighteen costs when determining future damages;
and, because the jury heard evidence concerning the patient's then pre-
sent physical state, her past medical care and expenses, and the nature
and course of her injuries, the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain
the jury's award of $600,000 in medical expenses after the child reached
the age of eighteen.48
C. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
In Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed that
"when an attorney commits malpractice in the prosecution or defense of
a claim that results in litigation, the statute of limitations on a malpractice
claim against that attorney is tolled until all appeals on the underlying
claim are exhausted or the litigation is otherwise finally concluded. '49
Apex Towing hired Tolin and his law firm to defend them against a mari-
time personal injury suit in a Texas court. The defendants allegedly failed
to file a timely maritime-limitation of liability pleading, which left Apex
exposed to a judgment in excess of the value of the vessel and its freight
at issue in the underlying lawsuit. Apex hired other counsel to appeal the
judgment and ultimately settled the case. The court of appeals dismissed
the appeal on May 19, 1995.50
Apex filed malpractice claims on February 19, 1997. The defendants
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the two-year statute of
limitation began to run no later than January 27, 1995, when the parties
settled the underlying personal injury case.51 The trial court granted
summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. Recognizing that
several Texas courts have held that Murphy v. Campbell52 limited appli-
cation of the tolling rule recognized in Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins53 to
situations in which a party is forced to obtain new counsel, the Texas Su-
preme Court granted Apex's petition for review.
The law firm defendants argued that Murphy modified the Hughes rule
so that the statute of limitations runs no later than when a party hires new
counsel to handle the underlying litigation. 54 The defendants relied on a
section in Murphy in which the majority opinion responded to a dissent,
47. Id. at 350.
48. Id.
49. 41 S.W.3d 118, 119 (Tex. 2001).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 964 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. 1997).
53. 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991).
54. Apex Towing, 41 S.W.3d at 120.
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stating: "[Hughes] is expressly limited to claims against a lawyer arising
out of litigation where the party must not only assert inconsistent posi-
tions but must also obtain new counsel."55
The supreme court reasoned that Hughes set forth two policies as the
basis for tolling limitations until all appeals on the underlying claim are
exhausted. First, the court was concerned with forcing a client to adopt
inconsistent litigation postures in the underlying case and the malpractice
case.5 6 Second, limitations should be tolled because the viability of the
malpractice action depends on the outcome of the underlying litigation.57
The court rejected the "continued representation" requirement that some
Texas courts have applied based on Hughes, stating that hiring a new at-
torney would not necessarily solve the problem of having to adopt incon-
sistent positions.58 Thus, when a lawyer commits malpractice in litigation,
the statute of limitations is tolled until the underlying case is finally con-
cluded. The court also held that the settlement of the underlying case
does not eliminate any claim for damages sought in a malpractice
action. 59
Decided the same day as Apex Towing, the supreme court held in Un-
derkofler v. Vanasek that the Hughes rule does not toll the statute of limi-
tations for Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims.60 Because the
Legislature adopted a specific statute of limitations for DTPA claims,
which includes only two exceptions to the general rule, the court declined
to apply Hughes to DTPA claims about legal malpractice. The court thus
overruled Aduddell v. Parkhill, issued the same day as Hughes, which had
applied a tolling rule to DTPA claims.61
In Brents v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P., the Dallas Court of Appeals ap-
plied Apex Towing and Underkofler.62 Haynes and Boone represented
the plaintiffs in a real estate action that the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development later challenged as discriminatory.
The unusual situation existed in which the underlying claim was final but
later litigation that resulted from the alleged malpractice was not final
until years after that date.63 This issue was not addressed by Apex Tow-
ing or Underkofler. The Dallas Court of Appeals strictly followed the
Texas Supreme Court's direction that a bright-line limitations rule should
apply in legal malpractice cases and declined to broaden "litigation" to
include an administrative investigation that might later result in a
lawsuit. 64
Two Texas courts held that a plaintiff is not permitted to fracture legal
55. Id. (quoting Murphy, 964 S.W.2d at 273).
56. Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 156.
57. Id. at 157.
58. Apex Towing, 41 S.W.3d at 121.
59. Id.
60. Underkofler v. Vanasek, 53 S.W.3d 343 (Tex. 2001).
61. 821 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. 1991).
62. 53 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. filed).




malpractice claims into additional causes of action.65 In each case, a
plaintiff was not permitted to assert additional causes of actions, such as
breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, where the plaintiff's mal-
practice claim was either denied on summary judgment or otherwise
dismissed.
Swinehart v. Stubbeman, McRae, Sealy, Laughlin & Browder, Inc. held
that an attorney in a legal malpractice action is not limited to the same
affirmative defenses raised by the defendant in the underlying suit.66 The
attorney defendants argued that the statute of frauds would have barred
the former client's recovery and, therefore, the plaintiff could not prove
that he would have prevailed on the underlying cause of action but for
the attorneys' negligence.67 The plaintiff countered that the defendants
in the underlying lawsuit did not allege statute of frauds as an affirmative
defense and that the law firm defendants in the malpractice action waived
the statute of frauds by failing to plead the affirmative defense in the
legal malpractice action.68 The court rejected the plaintiff's waiver the-
ory, holding that an attorney in a legal malpractice suit is not limited to
the same affirmative defenses raised by the defendant in the underlying
suit and that an attorney in a legal malpractice suit is not required to raise
the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense to claims sounding in negli-
gence and gross negligence because it is merely raised to negate
causation.69
D. NEGLIGENT HIRING, TRAINING, SUPERVISING
The question in Wise v. Complete Staffing Services was whether a staff-
ing agency had a duty to conduct a criminal history check on a temporary
employee that went beyond the records of Harris County, the residence
of the employee for the past four years, when the employee otherwise
had a good work record.70 The court found no duty to conduct this addi-
tional check, noting that "the social implications of requiring an unlimited
background check of all employees, and then imposing liability if an em-
ployee is harmed by the criminal actions of a co-worker, are beyond what
we believe would be appropriate. '71 The court stressed that the assault
giving rise to the suit did not result from any incompetence or unfitness
for the job, but by the intervening criminal act of an employee. Thus, the
employer, and by extension the staffing agency supplying temporary em-
ployees, had no duty to check the criminal histories of its employees un-
less directly related to the duties of the job at hand.72
65. See Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no
pet.); Cuyler v. Minns, 60 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. filed).
66. 48 S.W.3d 865, 876 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
67. Id. at 874-75.
68. Id. at 875-76.
69. Id. at 876.
70. 56 S.W.3d 900 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
71. Id. at 905.
72. Id. at 903 (citing Guidry v. Nat'l Freight, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 807, 811 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1997, no writ)).
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The court held in Duge v. Union Pacific Railroad that an employer did
not have a duty to exercise control over a fatigued employee who was
involved in an accident on the way home from work.73 The court distin-
guished Otis Engineering v. Clark, in which an employer was held liable
for an accident caused by a visibly intoxicated employee driving home
from work,74 on the basis that the defendant in the present case had no
comparable knowledge of the employee's condition. 75
In Larkin v. Johnson, the court of appeals held that an off-duty police
officer was not acting within the course and scope of his employment
when he followed a customer outside and arrested him for stealing.76
Additionally, because the acts of making an arrest and turning the case
over to the district attorney's office were within the scope of a deputy
sheriff's authority, the officer was entitled to official immunity. 77
Two opinions during the Survey period analyzed hiring decisions by
law enforcement officials. Both cases found those decisions protected by
immunity doctrines. 78
In the case of Ana, Inc., v. Lowry, a convenience store customer was
attacked by a store employee after complaining about the store's high
prices. 79 The issue was whether the company who owned the store was
responsible for the acts of the employee. The court relied upon Texas &
Pacific Railway v. Hagenloh, in which the Texas Supreme Court described
the limits of an employer's responsibility for an employee's assault on a
third party.80 Observing that "[i]t is not ordinarily within the scope of a
servant's authority to commit an assault on a third person," the Court
went on to say that there could be liability if "the employee's duty is to
guard the employer's property. '81 Because no evidence showed the em-
ployee's responsibilities other than the plaintiff's own observation that
the employee was the only person in the store, the court found no evi-
dence that the employee was within the course and scope of his authority
at the time of the incident.82
73. 71 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied).
74. 668 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. 1983).
75. Duge, 71 S.W.3d at 362.
76. 44 S.W.3d 188, 189-90 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
77. Id. at 189, 190 n.1 ("If Clark Kent is outraged about wrongdoing he discovers while
on assignment, his anger is not kryptonite. He is nonetheless Superman as he sallies forth
to fight for truth, justice, and the American Way.").
78. See Dovalina v. Nuno, 48 S.W.3d 279 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.);
Wood County v. Rivers, 51 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App.-Iler 2000, pet. denied).
79. 31 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
80. See id. at 769 (citing Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Hagenloh, 247 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. 1952)).
81. Id. (quoting Hagenloh, 247 S.W.2d at 239, 241).
82. Id. at 771. Because of the same lack of evidence about responsibilities, the court





In Turner v. KTRK Television, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that a
defamation claim could be based on a publication as a whole rather than
specific statements.83 In Turner, a candidate for mayor of Houston sued a
television reporter and a television company after the broadcast of a story
questioning the role the candidate played in an attempted multi-million
dollar life insurance scam. Although the candidate was ahead in the polls
before the broadcast, he ultimately lost the mayoral race. The candi-
date's connection with the alleged insurance scam included the prepara-
tion and probate of the will of a man who ultimately faked his death and
collected benefits. 84 The broadcast contained statements that were liter-
ally or substantially true, but were juxtaposed in such a way as to create a
misleading impression. Specifically, the broadcast informed listeners that
the candidate was denied payment for his services by the executor of the
estate, but did not say that the payment request was denied because it
was untimely.85
Although the supreme court ultimately found that the plaintiff could
not support a cause of action due to a lack of showing of sufficient evi-
dence of actual malice, the court's analysis of whether a public figure
could bring a defamation claim based on a broadcast as a whole is signifi-
cant. The supreme court disapproved of other cases to the extent that
they have held that a plaintiff cannot bring a claim for defamation based
on a publication as a whole. 86 The court also distinguished two of its
previous cases. In the first, Randall's Food Markets v. Johnson, the court
held that a defendant cannot be held liable for presenting a true account
of events, regardless of what someone might conclude from the account.87
Randall's did not involve, however, the omission of material facts or the
misleading juxtaposition of true facts. 88 The court also noted that in Cain
v. Hearst Corp. it had rejected the "false light" tort because it "largely
duplicated defamationwithout the more established tort's procedural and
substantive safeguards." 89
Business disparagement claims were brought against a magazine au-
thor and the author's source for his article in Granada Biosciences, Inc. v.
Forbes, Inc.90 The court of appeals held that, as with a defamation claim,
83. 38 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. 2000).
84. Id. at 109-10.
85. Id. at 111-13.
86. See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos. v. Gill, 6 S.W.3d 19, 43 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999,
pet. denied); Evans v. Dolcefino, 986 S.W.2d 69, 78 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999,
no pet.); KTRK Television, Inc. v. Fowkes, 981 S.W.2d 779, 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); Hardwick v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 943 S.W.2d 183, 185
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
87. 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995).
88. See Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 115.
89. 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994).
90. 49 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.).
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a public figure plaintiff in a business disparagement action must prove
actual malice. The court rejected the plaintiff's position that because def-
amation and business disparagement were designed to protect different
interests, a public figure plaintiff bringing a business disparagement ac-
tion should not be required to meet the same elements as a public figure
plaintiff bringing a defamation action. Instead, the court found that the
same constitutional protections set forth in New York Times v. Sullivan9
and its progeny applied. The court further noted that the differences be-
tween defamation and business disparagement typically result in more
stringent requirements on plaintiffs who allege business disparagement
claims. 92
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals found in Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v.
Goodman that sometimes a kiss is not just a kiss and upheld the jury's
verdict for the plaintiff in a slander action. 93 The plaintiff resigned from
Minyard Food Stores after the store manager told two other workers that
he had kissed, hugged, and given the married plaintiff back massages.
Although the plaintiff admitted receiving two back massages and a
friendly hug, she emphatically denied ever kissing the manager.94 After
both the manager and the employee were transferred to different loca-
tions, rumors spread that the transfer was due to an affair between the
two employees, and the plaintiff quit her job. Minyard argued that the
manager's statements were substantially true and therefore not defama-
tory because the plaintiff acknowledged hugging and receiving a massage
from him. Minyard argued that "adding a kiss to this mix simply does not
alter the nature of the relationship. ' 95 The court upheld the jury's verdict
finding that the jury, notwithstanding the plaintiff's admissions, could
have reasonably concluded that the manager's statements that he kissed
the plaintiff and engaged in "heavy petting" and a "make out session"
were false.96
In Bell v. Lee, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a summary
judgment for a defendant in a defamation suit brought after an attorney
made allegedly defamatory comments in a letter written in contemplation
of litigation. 97 In Bell, a police officer investigated a financial "scheme"
involving a local church. The officer received a letter from the church's
lawyer claiming that the officer's inquiries had damaged the church's re-
lationship with the bank as well as its reputation. The letter threatened a
91. 376 U.S. 254 (1965).
92. Granada, 49 S.W.3d at 618 (citing Hurlbut v. Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 749
S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex. 1987)).
93. 50 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. granted).
94. Id. at 138.
95. Id.
96. Id. The court also held that the manager was acting in the course and scope of his
employment even though his statements were not true because they were made in re-
sponse to the company's investigation of another employee's complaint. Further, the em-
ployer was not able to defeat the claim based on the qualified privilege because the jury
found that the statements were made with actual malice.
97. 49 S.W.3d 8 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
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slander lawsuit and demanded an apology from the police officer. Copies
of the letter were sent to the professional standards section of the San
Antonio Police Department and the San Antonio City Attorney. 98 The
officer sued the church and its lawyers for slander, and the defendants
sought summary judgment asserting that their statements were absolutely
privileged because they were made by an attorney in contemplation of
litigation. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the privilege
did not further representation and instead held that the privilege attaches
if the statement has some relationship to a contemplated proceeding, re-
gardless of whether it in fact furthers the representation.99
Finally, in Wheeler v. Methodist Hospital, the First Court of Appeals
held that each publication of reports by the National Practitioner Data
Bank ("NPDB") was a discreet actionable event for purposes of deter-
mining whether a defamation claim is barred by limitations. 100 The
NPDB reported on March 17, 1995, that a doctor was suspended for fail-
ure to adhere to a practice improvement plan. The doctor did not bring
suit until November 13, 1996, alleging defamation and business disparage-
ment. Although the court found that the doctor knew or should have
known about the NPDB report by the date of the letters, citing evidence
that the doctor received at least three letters that should have put him on
notice of the NPDB's report, it held that the doctor's claims were not
barred by limitations due to subsequent publications. Specifically, the
NPDB republished the report on November 14, 1995 and August 6,
1996-both dates within one year of the date the lawsuit was filed.
Therefore, the doctor's claims resulting from those two publications were
not barred by the statute.
B. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The Texas Supreme Court held in Bradford v. Vento that, as a matter of
law, it is not "extreme and outrageous" for a business manager to com-
plain to police about a suspected trespasser. 10 1 The court observed that
preventing disturbances on mall property is "a managerial function that is
necessary to the ordinary operation of a business organization.' 0 2 The
court noted that, even though the manager could have given the police
more information than he did, his failure to do so was within a permis-
sible exercise of his rights as a mall manager. 10 3
98. Id. at 10.
99. Id. at 11.
100. No. 01-98-00922-CV, 2000 WL 1877658 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no
pet.).
101. 48 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001).
102. Id. at 759 (quoting Randall's Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644
(Tex. 1995)).
103. Id. (citing Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex. 1993) (holding that it is
not extreme and outrageous for an employer to have a terminated employee escorted from
the premises by a security guard)).
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The case of Gaspard v. Beadle involved an attorney who began a sexual
relationship with his client during his representation of her in a di-
vorce. 104 The attorney ended the relationship and then sent her an in-
voice for legal work. The plaintiff suffered emotional distress and
bewilderment for receiving a bill for services that she thought the attor-
ney would do for free. 10 5 While the court observed that "[t]he timing of
his bill and the manner in which [the attorney] performed the legal work
was not prudent," it is still the case that "[i]nsensitive or rude behavior
does not amount to outrageous behavior. ' 10 6 Thus, the element of outra-
geous conduct was not satisfied.
In Rescar, Inc. v. Ward, the court held that, just because a plaintiff has
won a Sabine Pilot claim based on his discharge for refusing to perform
an illegal act, the conduct of that employer is not automatically "extreme
and outrageous.'1 0 7 The court went on to hold that a threat to "black-
ball" the plaintiff in the trucking industry did not rise to the level of being
"utterly intolerable in a civilized community" so as to give rise to liability
under this tort.'0 8 Additionally, the court concluded that, even though
the plaintiff had worried about his finances and suffered a "mild to me-
dium" form of depression for a year, after which he fully recovered on his
own, these facts were insufficient to prove "severe" distress so as to give
rise to tort liability.' 0 9
When the jury heard testimony that a husband threw things at his wife,
broke things in her presence, spit on the wife, argued at length with her,
locked her out of the house, and poured various substances on her, the
jury could conclude that his conduct was sufficiently outrageous to sup-
port tort liability.110 In stating the applicable standards, the court of ap-
peals noted that intentional infliction of emotional distress does not
necessarily require evidence of the physical aspects of assault or battery,
but also acknowledged that the fact that conduct is intentional, malicious,
or even criminal does not, standing alone, make it extreme and outra-
geous for purposes of this tort. 1 ' A court must consider the context of
the conduct at issue and the relationship between the parties, and when
repeated or ongoing severe harassment is shown, the conduct should be
evaluated as a whole in determining whether it is extreme and
outrageous. n2
104. 36 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
105. Id. at 237.
106. Id. at 238.
107. 60 S.W.3d 169, 180 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. filed) (citing Sabine
Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 734-35 (Tex. 1985)).
108. Id. at 181.
109. Id. at 181.
110. Toles v. Toles, 45 S.W.3d 252, 262 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied).
111. Id. at 262.
112. See id. (citing GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 615-16 (Tex. 1999)).
The court also held that, despite the defendant's claims that he did not intend harm, the
circumstances of his violent actions toward his wife could allow a jury to conclude that,
notwithstanding his disclaimers, his actions were done with knowledge of a high degree of
risk of harm to his wife. Id. at 260.
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Evidence that an insurance company "pursued a damaging course of
action against [a terminated agent] even after [he] was fired, by involving
several federal agencies with punitive power such as the IRS" and trying
to have the agent's insurance license revoked, when this activity was "ap-
parently unnecessary and largely unexplained," was legally sufficient to
support a determination that the insurance company's conduct was
"outrageous." 113
In the case of Henderson v. Wellman, the court held that the filing of
sexual harassment charges by a part-time office worker against her super-
visor, even though there was a factual dispute as to whether some of her
allegations were true, did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous
conduct necessary for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.114 The court reasserted that wrongful termination, standing alone,
is not evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct 15 and that a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress does not lie for ordinary em-
ployment disputes. 11 6
The conclusory statement in an affidavit that the plaintiff's emotional
distress "rated a 10 on a 1-10 scale" after a billing dispute with a utility
company did not raise a fact issue on the element of "severe" emotional
distress. The court noted that argument and evidence about whether the
conduct of the defendants was outrageous was not pertinent to whether
the plaintiff suffered severe distress. 117
On the other hand, sufficient evidence was offered to create a fact issue
on whether emotional distress was severe when a hospital failed to pro-
vide pathology slides needed for a second opinion, for an extended pe-
riod of time, during which it knew that the patient was upset to the point
of needing antidepressants.' 8 The court also noted that the hospital's
knowledge about the plaintiff's distress was significant in finding that the
conduct was outrageous. 11 9
C. PREMISES LIABILITY
The Waco Court of Appeals held in Torres v. City of Bellmeade that
competitive team sports, such as softball, are not the type of activity con-
templated by the legislature in enacting the Recreational-Use Statute,
which provides that a landowner who allows or invites another to enter
his property for recreational purposes does not owe the other a greater
113. Tex. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Sears, 54 S.W.3d 361, 375 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001,
pet. granted) (citing GTE Southwest, 998 S.W.2d at 612).
114. 43 S.W.3d 591, 597 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
115. Id. at 596 (citing Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Franco, 971 S.W.2d 52, 54
(Tex. 1998)).
116. Id. (citing GTE Southwest, 998 S.W.2d at 612-13).
117. Bailey v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 27 S.W.3d 713, 717 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000,
pet. ref'd).
118. Elliott v. Methodist Hosp., 54 S.W.3d 789, 797 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2001, pet. filed).
119. Id. at 797.
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degree of care than that owed to a trespasser.120 The plaintiff was injured
while sitting on a swing after her softball team was eliminated from a
tournament at the city's softball complex. The court rejected the defen-
dant's assertion that a competitive sport is one of the recreational activi-
ties contemplated under the statute. It cited a South Dakota Supreme
Court case about a similar statute, which specifically referenced winter
sports but not summer sports.121 That court held that the inclusion of
"winter sports" seemed to imply the consideration and rejection of sum-
mer sports, such as softball. 122 The Waco Court of Appeals agreed with
this reasoning, holding that the Texas Legislature could have included
"competitive team sports" in the definition of "recreation" had it in-
tended to include them, and reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant.123
A no-evidence summary judgment in favor of the defendant was af-
firmed in Lavy v. Pitts.124 Pitts owned a working interest in oil leases for
which joint venture agreements gave him full power to direct the busi-
ness, as well the right to delegate all or any part of that power to another
entity, Dallas Production, Inc. ("DPI"). Pitts delegated all of its power to
DPI, and an employee of DPI was injured while working on the property.
The plaintiff alleged that since Pitts kept the right to control production
on the property, Pitt owed him, as an invitee, a duty of reasonable care to
either remedy or warn of dangerous conditions. The Eastland Court of
Appeals found no evidence of a nexus between any control retained by
the defendant and a duty of care owed to the plaintiff. Although Pitts
retained the power to remove DPI if operations were not performed in a
good and workmanlike manner, the court noted that a good and work-
manlike manner does not necessarily implicate safety concerns. 125 Inter-
estingly, because the plaintiff failed to plead alter ego or any other theory
that would have allowed the plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil, it was
irrelevant that the defendant served on the board of DPI and owned a
controlling interest in the company.
In Texas Department of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, a trial court's
order denying the Department's plea to the jurisdiction was affirmed
where the plaintiffs alleged in their petition that the department was
120. Torres v. City of Bellmead, 40 S.W.3d 662, 665 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet.
granted).
121. Johnson v. Rapid City Softball Ass'n, 514 N.W.2d 693, 695-696 (S.D. 1994).
122. Id. at 696.
123. The court recognized two subsequent amendments to the statute that bolster the
exclusion of competitive sports from the statute. The first amendment included a general
catch-all phrase referring to "any other activity associated with enjoying nature or the out-
doors." TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.001(3) (Vernon 1996). Under the ca-
non of construction ejusdem generis, a general phrase is limited to the same types of things
listed more specifically. The court also considered an amendment that added "hockey, in-
line hockey, skating and skateboarding if conducted in indoor municipal facilities." The
court found that the specific inclusion of hockey and in-line hockey implied the considera-
tion and rejection by the legislature of other competitive team sports. Id. § 75.002(e).
124. 29 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. ref'd).
125. Id. at 358-59. The statutory scheme at issue in this case has since been amended.
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aware of the dangers of falling tree branches, failed to remedy them, and
deliberately failed to warn the plaintiffs of the dangerous condition. 26
Absent an allegation that the plaintiffs' allegations were pled merely as a
sham to wrongfully obtain jurisdiction, the court was not permitted to
consider the substance of the plaintiffs' claims but could only determine
whether the pleading stated a premises defect claim based on gross negli-
gence. In this case, the Recreational-Use Statute could only bar a finding
of jurisdiction if the plaintiff failed to properly plead in its petition a suffi-
cient statement claiming that the department injured the plaintiff will-
fully, wantonly, or through gross negligence. 127
In American Industries Life Insurance Co. v. Ruvalcaba, an $8 million
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was reversed.' 28 In that case, the two-
year-old son of an employee of a private security company fell from a
staircase and suffered a traumatic brain injury resulting in permanent
damage. The child and his mother were visiting the employee father for
lunch. The Ruvalcabas sued the owner of the building, alleging that the
child was an invitee at the time of the accident and that the open staircase
from which the child fell constituted an unreasonably unsafe condition. 129
After a bench trial, the trial court found that the defendants were liable
as owners of the premises and were negligent. The court of appeals
found no evidence that the child was a business invitee.13o Specifically,
the court found no evidence that the child was invited on the premises by
the defendants or of any mutual benefit from that visit. The court also
considered whether the child was an invitee under section 360 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, adopted by the supreme court in Parker v.
Highland Park, Inc.,131 and determined that Parker was limited to situa-
tions involving an apartment complex or a store offering goods for sale to
the public. Finally, the court rejected any theory that the child was an
invitee merely because he was a child of the tenants, or because he was a
visitor to a public building. 132
A plaintiff's jury verdict was reversed by the San Antonio Court of
Appeals in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rosa, holding that there was no evi-
dence from which it could be inferred that Wal-Mart had actual knowl-
edge or constructive notice of the premises defect, a piece of banana, for
so long that the banana should have been removed. 133 Circumstantial
evidence must establish "that it is more likely than not that the dangerous
condition existed long enough to give the proprietor a reasonable oppor-
tunity to discover the condition."'1 34 There was testimony from the plain-
126. 55 S.W.3d 648, 651-52 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
127. Id. at 651 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.002(c)).
128. 64 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
129. Id. at 131.
130. Id. at 141.
131. 565 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex. 1978).
132. Am. Indus., 64 S.W.3d 126 at 135-40.
133. 52 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. ref'd).




tiff's daughter-in-law that the banana was brown and typically it takes 45
minutes for a banana to turn brown and from the plaintiff herself that the
banana "looked to her to have been there awhile," as well as a descrip-
tion of the number and proximity of Wal-Mart employees at the scene
and of a three-inch wide-angled mirror on the wall. The court held this
evidence was not sufficient to show that it was more likely than not that
the banana had been on the floor for a long time. Rather, the circum-
stantial evidence merely supported the possibility that the dangerous con-
dition existed long enough for Wal-Mart to have discovered it.135 In a
dissent, Chief Justice Hardberger questioned the role of jurors and
judges, noting that if circumstantial evidence supports more than one rea-
sonable inference, it is for the jury to decide which is more reasonable. 136
Of particular interest to Justice Hardberger was that the jury ruled in
favor of the plaintiff after hearing testimony from two Wal-Mart employ-
ees that the customer in line in front of the plaintiff was holding a baby
who was eating a banana, which was the unrefuted source of the danger-
ous condition.
D. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
In Meritor Automotive, Inc. v. Ruan Leasing Co., the Texas Supreme
Court interpreted a section of the Texas Products Liability Act which re-
quires the manufacturer of an allegedly defective product to indemnify
the seller for any loss arising from a products liability action, except when
the seller independently causes the loss.1 37 The question was whether the
seller's cost to defend an unsuccessful negligence claim, asserted in addi-
tion to a products liability claim, was part of the "loss arising out of a
products liability action" falling within the manufacturer's duty to indem-
nify under the statute.1 38 The supreme court concluded that it was. The
court agreed that the word "action" in the statute includes all direct alle-
gations against the seller that relate to the plaintiff's injury, noting that if
it did not, there would be no need for the statute to limit liability for
certain negligence claims arising from the seller's negligence.1 39 The
court further observed that the legislative history of the statute generally
confirmed its reading, as the Senate Bill Analysis explained that the Act's
purpose was to "expand the indemnity rights sellers now have."140
This statute was also at issue in Oasis Oil, Inc. v. Koch Refining Co.,
which involved a seller's right to indemnity after the seller settled a prod-
ucts liability action involving damage caused by chemicals sold and pur-
135. Id. at 844.
136. Id. at 847.
137. 44. S.W.3d 86 (Tex. 2001) (analyzing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM CODE § 82.002(a)
(Vernon 2001)).
138. Meritor, 44 S.W.3d at 87.
139. Id. at 90 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.002(a) (Vernon 2001)).
140. Id. at 91 (quoting SENATE COMM. ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, BILL ANALYSIS,
Tex. S.B. 4, 73rd Leg., R.S. at 2 (1993)).
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chased originally from the manufacturer. 141 In reversing a "no evidence"
summary judgment, the court reminded that a seller's indemnity claim
does not require proof of the usual tort concepts of causation, chain of
custody, or product defect.142 A claimant need only prove that it is a
statutory seller which suffered a qualifying loss in a products liability ac-
tion as defined by the statute, and that the defendant qualify as a statu-
tory manufacturer. 143
In the case of Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, the court of ap-
peals analyzed what warnings are required about the use of silica flint to a
user generally knowledgeable about the risks of breathing silica dust.144
After analyzing prior Texas precedent as well as the treatment of these
issues by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court concluded that the
trial court has the responsibility to determine the validity of the sophisti-
cated user defense via the "reasonableness" test as set out in section 388
of the Restatement.145 After finding a duty to warn, the trial court cor-
rectly asked the jury whether the warning was adequate under the cir-
cumstances, and did not err in denying a requested jury question about
the sophisticated user defense. 146 A dissent argued that, under the facts
of this case, the sophisticated user defense was an absolute bar to
recovery.147
The case of Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. v. Blakely addressed the submission
of a causation question to the jury in a products liability action about a
hard object in a cookie. 148 The court began by critiquing a confusing jury
instruction about what the "occurrence in question" was, noting several
"nonsensical" findings that the jury could have made based on the in-
struction given. The court held the necessary findings could be implied
from the charge submitted, but noted that the case "illustrates the advisa-
bility of clearly defining any use of the word 'occurrence' in the charge,
and reviewing the pleadings, proof, and the remainder of the charge to
insure the rest of the jury questions make sense in light of that
definition.' 49
The court went on to find a fatal conflict between the jury's answers to
two questions. In response to question number one, the jury answered
"no" to whether a manufacturing defect in the cookie was a producing
141. 60 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (analyzing TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 82.001-.006) (Vernon 2001).
142. Id. at 255.
143. Id. (citing Meritor, 44 S.W.3d at 91).
144. 48 S.W.3d 487, 493 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 & cmt. n (1965). Under the reasonable-
ness test, "the magnitude of the risk involved must be compared with the burden which
would be imposed by requiring them ... and the magnitude of the risk is determined not
only by the chance that some harm may result but also the serious or trivial character of
the harm which is likely to result." Id. cmt. n.
146. Humble Sand, 48 S.W.3d at 502.
147. Id. at 508 (Cornelius, C.J., dissenting).
148. 30 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.).




cause of the occurrence, while in response to question number three, the
jury answered "yes" to whether the cookie dough supplied by the defen-
dant was unfit for ordinary purposes because of a defect and, if so,
whether the unfit condition was a proximate cause of the occurrence.'50
Analyzing the pleadings, evidence, and nature of the plaintiff's injuries,
the court concluded that the jury was asked functionally identical ques-
tions even though two distinct causes of action were involved, and thus
found the "yes" and "no" answers were in fatal conflict.' 51
The case of Coleman v. Cintas Sales Corp. arose from burns suffered by
a country club employee when fire flared at an employee barbeque as he
was cooking.152 The employee sued the clothing manufacturer who
leased his uniform to the country club. The particular uniform he was
wearing was designed for employees who would not be exposed to a risk
of flammability in the workplace, and the plaintiff did not ordinarily work
in any task that would require him to weld, burn trash, or use tools that
required an open flame. The court held that a seller is not required to
provide flame-retardant uniforms when there is no foreseeable risk of
exposure to fire associated with the product's clearly intended use; there-
fore, summary judgment was appropriate on the plaintiff's claim for de-
sign defect.' 53 However, as to the duty to warn claims, the court held it
was potentially foreseeable that the fabric might be used near flame, and
found a fact issue as to whether the plaintiff would have used additional
caution had he been properly warned that the fabric might worsen any
burn injury.' 54 Accordingly, the plaintiff was allowed to proceed with his
claim for marketing defect. 155
In the course of finding fact issues on other theories of liability, the
court in Allen v. WA. Virnau & Sons, Inc. held that a tractor dealership
had no duty to warn an experienced, safety-conscious tractor user of the
"open and obvious" risk of falling off or being thrown from a tractor,
particularly a tractor doing "bush hog" work.156
In Roland v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation, the court of appeals af-
firmed a summary judgment that a pickup truck manufacturer has no
duty to warn of the dangers of riding in an open pickup bed. 157 The court
observed: "We firmly believe that people have a sufficient intuitive grasp
of the basic laws of physics to ensure that if one is in an open and unpro-
150. Id. at 689.
151. Id. at 691.
152. 40 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
153. Id. at 549.
154. Id. at 550-51. Other summary judgment theories, as well as affirmative defenses,
were apparently raised for the first time on appeal and thus not considered by the court of
appeals, including the affirmative defenses of "common knowledge" and "learned interme-
diary." Id.
155. Id. at 551-52.
156. 28 S.W.3d 226, 234-35 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. denied) (citing Caterpil-
lar, Inc. v. Schears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 382-86 (Tex. 1995), and Sauder Custom Fabrication,
Inc. v. Boyd, 967 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1998)).
157. 33 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied).
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tected area of a truck, the consequences of a sudden start, stop, or turn
are understood and appreciated as a matter of common knowledge."'1 58
E. LIQUOR LIABILITY
The case of Bruce v. K.K.B., Inc. involved a summary judgment in a
dram shop liability case.159 The trial court found no evidence that it was
apparent to the defendant restaurant that the plaintiff was obviously in-
toxicated to the extent she presented a clear danger to herself and
others.160 A bartender and waiter testified that the plaintiff ordered a
bottle of wine in the afternoon, did not appear intoxicated, behaved nor-
mally, and had a quiet dinner.161 The plaintiff then lost control of her car
roughly an hour later and was killed in a collision. The court reversed the
summary judgment, citing expert testimony about the likely symptoms of
intoxication that would have been visible in the restaurant given her high
blood alcohol content at the time of the accident. 162
The same issue arose in Cianci v. M. Till, Inc., in which the court held
that testimony from a reliable expert about the visible effects of a likely
intoxication level was enough to avoid summary judgment, even though
witnesses said that the plaintiff did not appear visibly intoxicated. 163
Cianci also involved the "safe harbor" provision of the Dram Shop Act,
under which actions of an employee that violate the Act are not attributa-
ble to the employer if the employer has given certain training to the em-
ployee.' 64 The court found that a former server's testimony that her
manager told her to keep serving alcohol to obviously intoxicated people
until "he made his decision on whether they needed to be served or not"
raised a fact issue as to whether the defendant encouraged its employees
to serve intoxicated people and thus lost the protection of the "safe har-
bor.' 65 The court also found that no collateral estoppel bar to the suit
arose from an administrative proceeding before the TABC involving the
defendant company, because the plaintiff was not a party to that
proceeding.' 66
F. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
The case of First Valley Bank v. Martin arose from a bank's efforts to
foreclose on seventy-five head of cattle pledged as security for a loan.' 67
158. Id. at 470.
159. 52 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied).
160. See TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.02 (b)(1), (2) (Vernon 2001).
161. Bruce, 52 S.W.3d at 255.
162. Id. at 256. Bruce distinguished J.D. Abrams, Inc. v. Mclver, 966 S.W.2d 87, 90-92
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied), in which the court held that mere in-
volvement in an accident after leaving a bar does not raise a fact issue about the individ-
ual's intoxication.
163. 34 S.W.3d 327, 331-32 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, no pet.).
164. TEX. ALCO. BEV, CODE ANN § 106.14(a) (Vernon 2001).
165. Cianci, 34 S.W.3d at 330.
166. Id. at 330-31.
167. 55 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. filed).
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After the loan went into default, the bank found and sold twenty of the
cattle. Shortly thereafter, the bank loan officer told the local sheriff that
the bank had been unable to find any of the cattle, and upon the basis of
this information, a criminal prosecution was initiated for the offense of
hindering a secured creditor. 168 The court first held that, even though the
district attorney made the decision to prosecute, there can be tort liability
if "a person provides information which he knows is false to another to
cause a criminal prosecution." 169 The court then looked at the jury in-
structions, which let the jury find liability for "procurement" of a prose-
cution if the defendants "failed to fully and fairly disclose all material
information" to the authorities. 170 The court observed that in Browning
Ferris Industries v. Lieck, the supreme court focused simply on whether a
defendant made knowingly false statements to investigators. 171 The court
went on to review section 653 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, cited
in Lieck, which also notes that "conduct" can give rise to liability.172 The
court further noted that partial disclosure can give rise to civil liability in
several other situations in tort law, such as fraud, and approved the
instruction. 173
The case of McCall v. Tana Oil & Gas Corp. involved several tort
claims about judicial process arising from a contract dispute.' 74 The first
was for abuse of process, in which the plaintiffs claimed that defendants
brought a groundless suit after making threats that "something would
happen" unless another pending lawsuit was dismissed.' 75 The court af-
firmed summary judgment, noting that the citation obtained by defend-
ants "was procured by appellees and used for its intended purpose of
summoning the [parties] to appear and answer appellees' claims in that
suit."'1 76 The plaintiffs also sued for malicious prosecution. The lawsuit
complained of was terminated voluntarily. Acknowledging authority that
a non-suit is not a "termination in favor of the plaintiffs" required by the
tort of malicious prosecution, 177 the court also observed that, depending
upon the circumstances, the voluntary non-suit could be construed as a
favorable termination. 78 However, to prove malicious prosecution,
"[tihere must be some physical interference with a party's person or
168. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.33 (Vernon 2001).
169. Martin, 55 S.W.3d at 181 (quoting Browning Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Lieck, 881
S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tex. 1994)).
170. Id. at 185-86.
171. Id. (citing Lieck, 881 S.W.2d at 294).
172. Lieck, 881 S.W.2d at 294 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 cmt. g
(1977)).
173. Martin, 55 S.W.3d at 187.
174. No. 03-00-00347-CV, 2001 WL 838392 (Tex. App.-Austin July 26, 2001, pet.
filed).
175. Id. at *7.
176. Id. at *8.
177. Id. at *9 (citing Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 208 (Tex. 1996)).
178. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674(b) cmt. j (1977), and distin-
guishing K.T. Bolt Mfg. Co. v. Tex. Elec. Coops., Inc., 837 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1992, writ denied)).
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property in the form of an arrest, attachment, injunction, or sequestra-
tion," and the plaintiffs made no such claim other than a general allega-
tion that the lawsuit complicated the ongoing prosecution of another
case.179
The case of King v. Graham involved a dispute among tour guides who
conducted deer hunts in the Texas Hill Country.180 An indictment was
issued after a complaint to the sheriff that money had not been paid. The
indictment was later withdrawn because the contract had not been
breached, and it indicated that the parties had sued for malicious prose-
cution. The major issues were whether the defendants had "procured" a
criminal prosecution, whether there was probable cause for such a prose-
cution, and whether they had acted with malice. The court of appeals
found conflicting testimony about whether the statements to the sheriff
were false, and further noted that the failure to fully and fairly disclose
other material information to the sheriff was an alternative basis the jury
could rely upon to find procurement.18 1 The court found no error arising
from not putting the word "material" in the instruction about passing
false or misleading information to the authorities.182 As for probable
cause, the court noted an initial presumption of good faith, which can be
rebutted if the plaintiff produces evidence about the motives, grounds,
beliefs, and other evidence upon which the defendant acted.' 83 Again,
the court noted conflicting testimony, and observed from the timing of
events that "[i]n all likelihood, the jury felt that [plaintiff] acted too hast-
ily in reporting his suspicions" to the sheriff, and could thus find that the
defendants were using the criminal justice system because they had no
civil recourse under their contract. 8 4 Citing the same evidence about the
apparent haste with which prosecution was sought, the court found suffi-
cient evidence of malice as well. The court affirmed the damage award
and also affirmed the award against the defendants individually, even
though they performed acts as agents of a corporation. 185
In Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court observed that, while no
liability for false imprisonment can be imposed on a party who merely
reports facts to the authorities, a lack of full disclosure or misrepresenta-
tion of facts to authorities may result in liability under this tort.186 The
evidence showed that Wal-Mart reported a "hot" check, but did not dis-
179. McCall, 2001 WL 838392, at *9-10 (quoting Tex. Beef Cattle, 921 S.W.2d at 208-09
(citations omitted)).
180. 47 S.W.3d 595, 603-04 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
181. Id. at 605-06 (citing Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 519 (Tex.
1997)).
182. Id. at 606 (citing Lieck, 881 S.W.2d at 293).
183. Id. at 607 (citing Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 517-18).
184. Id. at 607-08.
185. King, 47 S.W.3d at 610-11. A dissent argued that no evidence showed that the
information given to the sheriff was material to the decision to prosecute, citing the testi-
mony of the officials who made the decision. Id. at 612, 613 (citing Lieck, 881 S.W.2d at
291).
186. 52 S.W.3d 814, 819 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. granted) (citing Bossin v.
Towber, 894 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied), and
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close that its check identification system could provide an erroneous
driver's license number under certain circumstances. This created a fact
issue as to whether Wal-Mart misled the district attorney's office into be-
lieving that the driver's license listed on the complaint form identified the
individual who committed the offense. 187 The court, however, affirmed
summary judgment for Wal-Mart on the "procurement" element of mali-
cious prosecution, finding no evidence that Wal-Mart knew the informa-
tion it provided was in fact false. 188 It also held that the torts of
negligence and gross negligence cannot exist in this context independent
from the malicious prosecution claim, or they would "in substance con-
vert the tort of malicious prosecution to one of negligent prosecution.' 89
G. WRONGFUL DEATH
The case of Sanchez v. Brownsville Sports Center, Inc. was a products
liability case against Honda Motor Company.190 The plaintiffs sued on
behalf of their ten-year old son who was killed in an ATV accident in
Mexico. The jury found Honda and each of the boy's parents to be 33 1/
3% responsible for the accident. The court affirmed the sufficiency of the
evidence to find the parents' negligence, noting the lack of supervision at
the time of the accident, the fact that the boy was not wearing a helmet,
the parents' lack of knowledge about proper air pressure for the ATV's
tires, and the failure of the boy to observe Mexican safety laws when the
accident occurred.
The trial court entered a take nothing judgment, apparently combining
the percentages assessed against the parents, and then determining that
because their collective responsibility was more than 60%, they were not
entitled to recovery.191 The court of appeals reversed, holding it was im-
proper to combine the percentages of separate claimants. The court al-
lowed each plaintiff to recover one-half of the $1,000,000 awarded by the
jury, since the percentage of responsibility of each plaintiff (33 1/3%)
equaled Honda's. 92 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's di-
rected verdict on the survival claims of the boy, citing an expert witness'
testimony that the boy had blacked out immediately upon the collision,
and discounting the testimony of an eyewitness that she looked away at
Leon's Shoe Stores, Inc. v. Hornsby, 306 S.W.2d 402, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957 no
writ)).
187. Id. at 819-20.
188. Id. at 821.
189. Id. (quoting Smith v. Sneed, 938 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no
writ)). A dissent argued that the responsibility for determining whether charges should be
brought rested with prosecutors and the police, not Wal-Mart, and distinguished the
Hornsby case cited by the majority because it arose in a small store where the plaintiff was
known and where a store employee had personal knowledge about the plaintiff's finances.
The dissent expressed misgivings about applying the standard from that case to the com-
puterized system used by Wal-Mart. Id. at 824, 825 (Rickhoff, J., concurring and
dissenting).
190. 51 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
191. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & CODE ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon 1997).
192. Sanchez, 51 S.W.3d at 657.
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the time of the accident as not probative of what the boy himself felt.193
III. DEFENSES
A. PREEMPTION
In the case of Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. Estate of Wells, the Texas
Supreme Court addressed whether state law tort claims arising from a
collision with a tractor-trailer rig are preempted because they conflict
with federal law. 194 The court affirmed the court of appeals' holding that
the claims were not expressly or impliedly preempted by either the Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act or Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard 108. The plaintiff's theory was that the trailer was not
visible at night. The defendant manufacturer contended that this claim
conflicted with the "conspicuity" regulations enacted by the Secretary of
Transportation. The trailer was manufactured in 1986; the court observed
that the Standard 108, enacted that year, set only minimum standards and
was only the first of a series of rules fully implementing these require-
ments.195 The court also rejected an argument that a heightened standard
in 1986 would have impeded the Secretary's investigation of potential
regulations, concluding that such a holding would create implied preemp-
tion anytime the Secretary studied the effectiveness of its regulations.1
96
The court also noted that the plaintiff's claims simply stated that the
manufacturer should have supplemented the truck's reflector system
rather than replacing it with a different system entirely. 197 The preemp-
tion analysis concluded by citing the "savings clause" in the statute.198
Throughout, the court placed great emphasis on the analysis used by the
United States Supreme Court in a recent opinion dealing with preemp-
tion of tort claims about passive restraints, even though that case ulti-
mately found conflict preemption. 199 The court also noted that its
conclusion was not inconsistent with the goal of uniformity in national
transportation regulations, and observed that the weight of authority
from other jurisdictions was consistent with the result.200
Similarly, plaintiffs' tort claims based upon the labeling of certain her-
bicides were held by the Eastland Court of Appeals to not be preempted
by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, & Rodenticide Act.201 The claims
dealt with the efficacy of the products, not the risks to humans and the
environment imposed by the use of the product, and thereby avoided the
193. Id. at 666-67.
194. 52 S.W.3d 737 (Tex. 2001).
195. Id. at 743-44.
196. Id. at 744-45.
197. Id. at 746
198. Great Dane Trailers, 52 S.W.3d at 746 (2001) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k)
("[C]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this sub-
chapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.")).
199. Id. at 741 (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884 (2000)).
200. Id. at 747, 748.
201. 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq.
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scope of the preemption provision in that federal statute.20 2 The Texas
Supreme Court has granted a petition for review in this case.
B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In the case of Pustejovsky v. Rapid-American Corp., the Texas Supreme
Court held that the "single action rule" and the statute of limitations did
not bar a plaintiff, who settled an asbestosis suit with one defendant in
1982, from bringing suit against different defendants twelve years later
for asbestos-related cancer.203 The court acknowledged the general rule
that a cause of action accrues upon injury even if the fact of injury is not
yet known, and further acknowledged that in a typical case involving pro-
gressive injuries, the single action rule may occasionally result in uncom-
pensated damages in order to vindicate other competing interests.
However, in an asbestos case where multiple latent injuries may manifest
years or even decades apart, the single action rule produces "much more
erratic results" than in the typical case.20 4 Citing general case law about
the discovery rule, and noting the requirement that a plaintiff may re-
cover damages for a future disease only if he shows a reasonable medical
probability that a disease will appear, the supreme court held that the
unfairness of not allowing a deserving plaintiff to recover outweighed the
defendant's interest in repose, particularly since the progression of the
disease provided a check on "stale and fraudulent claims. '20 5
After a review of "several different formulations" of the elements of
fraudulent concealment in Texas, the Northern District of Texas con-
cluded in Prieto v. John Hancock Mutual Life that the most appropriate
statement was as follows: "First, actual knowledge by the defendant that a
wrong has occurred, and second, a fixed purpose to conceal the facts nec-
essary for the plaintiff to know that it has cause of action. ' 206 The tolling
effect lasts "until the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered
with reasonable diligence. ' 20 7 The court found a fact issue on the appli-
cability of this doctrine, even though the court also concluded that the
plaintiff's claim was not "objectively verifiable" so as to fall within the
tolling doctrine of the discovery rule.20 8
A prison inmate must prove he exhausted all administrative remedies
within the penal grievance system before initiating a lawsuit, and must
then file suit within thirty-one days after receiving a written decision from
202. Geye v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 32 S.W.3d 916, 921 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet.
granted).
203. 35 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. 2000).
204. Id. at 652.
205. Id. at 652-53.
206. 132 F. Supp. 2d 506, 516 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (quoting Santanna Natural Gas Corp. v.
Hamon Operating Co., 954 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. denied)).
207. Id. at 513 (quoting Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Winograd, 956 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex.
1997)).
208. Id. at 514-15 (characterizing plaintiffs' allegations as "little more than 'a swearing
match between parties over facts and between experts over opinions"') (quoting In re
Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 215 (5th Cir. 1999)).
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the grievance system. 20 9 This provision controls over the general two-
year limitations period for personal injury.210
IV. OTHER ISSUES
A. INSURANCE
A home builder's failure to prepare the soil properly for a foundation
was not an "accident" and thus not an "occurrence" under the builder's
commercial general liability policy.211 The court relied upon the defini-
tion of "accident" used in a recent Texas Supreme Court opinion constru-
ing that term in an automobile liability policy, which held that "an injury
is accidental if 'from the viewpoint of the insured, [it is] not the natural
and probable consequence of the action or occurrence which produced
the injury; or in other words, if the injury could not reasonably be antici-
pated by [the] insured, or would not ordinarily follow from the action or
occurrence which caused the injury."212 The breach complained of was
intentional and thus did not fall within this definition.213
The issue in Carlton v. Trinity Universal Insurance was whether "inher-
ent diminished value" was a covered loss under the Texas standard auto
policy.214 The plaintiff's car was stolen and the thieves put more than
3,500 miles on the vehicle while it was in their possession. The insurance
carrier made repairs to the vehicle, which were not alleged to be im-
proper, inadequate, or incomplete, but the plaintiff alleged that the value
of the automobile was diminished to be at least $2,000 less than the "blue
book" trade-in value as a result of the theft. The court declined to defer
to a recent opinion of the Texas Department of Insurance, noting that the
policy language at issue was not ambiguous. 215 The court went on to con-
clude that where an insurer has fully, completely, and adequately "re-
paired or replaced the property with other of like kind and quality" as
required by the standard policy, then any reduction in market value of
the vehicle due to factors that are not subject to repair or replacement are
not compensable. The court noted that while the insured may well suffer
this type of damage as a result of direct or accidental loss, the plain lan-
guage of the standard policy clearly and unambiguously limits the in-
surer's liability to the "amount necessary to repair or replace the property
209. Wallace v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 36 S.W.3d 607 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §14.005(b) (Vernon
2001)).
210. Id. at 610-11.
211. Hartrick v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 62 S.W.3d 270, 278 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). The policy defined "occurrence" as "an accident, including con-
tinuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions." Id. at
275.
212. Id. at 276 (quoting Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex.
1999)).
213. Hartrick, 62 S.W.3d at 277.
214. 32 S.W.3d 454, 459 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
215. Id. at 459-60.
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with other of like kind and quality. 12 16
A claim for negligent misrepresentation was not subject to the discov-
ery rule, and was thus barred by the applicable statute of limitations,
when all that the insured needed to do to discover its alleged injury was
conduct a routine check regarding the insurance certificate with its carrier
and inquire whether insurance coverage was in effect.217 The court relied
upon the general limitations principles stated in the recent Texas Su-
preme Court opinion of HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel.2 1 8
In Lias v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the Dallas
Court of Appeals reminded that, while some cases hold that if there is no
insurance coverage, there can be no bad faith on the part of the insurer
for failure to pay a claim, a separate contract claim is not an absolute
prerequisite to a bad faith claim because the plaintiff can establish cover-
age in the tort action.21 9 The court went on to affirm the trial court's
summary judgment based on the lack of any evidence that the insurer
failed to attempt a prompt, fair settlement when the insurer's liability had
become reasonably clear.220
Tort claims against an insurer under the DTPA were not allowed in
Southstar Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines when they were premised on a
breach of the insurer's duty to defend.221 The court cited the analysis of
the issue by the San Antonio Court of Appeals, which recognized the
general principle that, for a tort duty to arise from a contractual duty, the
liability must arise "independent of the fact that a contract exists between
the parties" and that "when the only loss or damage is to the subject
matter of the contract, the plaintiff's action is ordinarily on the
contract." 22
2
The case of State Farm Lloyds v. Borum was an action against an in-
sured and his step-daughter for declaratory judgment that the home-
owner's policies provided no coverage for sexual molestation by the
insured.22 3 The main dispute was whether so-called "boundary viola-
tions"-indecent exposure without physical contact-triggered the "in-
ferred intent" rule, which says that intent to injure will be inferred as a
matter of law in cases involving sexual abuse of a minor, thus bringing
such cases outside the general rule that a person's intent to injure is a
question of fact.224 The court of appeals found that intent could be in-
216. Id. at 465.
217. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co. v. Holliday Ins. Agency, Inc., 54 S.W.3d 57, 62-63
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied).
218. 982 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1998).
219. 45 S.W.3d 330, 334-35 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.) (citing Aranda v. Ins. Co.
of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 213-14 (Tex. 1988)).
220. Id. at 335.
221. 42 S.W.3d 187, 194 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
222. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Pennington, 810 S.W.2d 777, 783 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1991, writ denied) (quoting Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d
493, 494 (Tex. 1991)).
223. 53 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied).
224. Id. at 888, 891.
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ferred in this case because of the repeated number of incidents and the
fact that they ultimately resulted in forced sexual contact with a minor,
which meant they were not separate and independent from the actual
physical contact. 225 Accordingly, State Farm had no duty to defend, and
thus no duty to indemnify. 226
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In reviewing a "no evidence" summary judgment, the court in Brown v.
Big D Transportation, Inc. recognized the "branded vehicle doctrine"
which provided that "when a vehicle displays the markings of an individ-
ual or a corporation, one may conclude that the named party is the owner
of the vehicle and the driver is the agent for the named party.122 7 The
rebuttable presumption created by this doctrine had not been rebutted in
the record before the court, making summary judgment inappropriate. 228
As an alternative basis for affirming a take-nothing judgment in a
premises defect case arising from a construction accident, the court in
Saenz v. David & David Construction Co. held that a proposed jury ques-
tion that does not touch on the issue of "control" when a subcontractor is
involved is improper because it is insufficient to allow a valid finding
against the general contractor.22 9
C. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
The Texas Supreme Court held in Lawrence v. CDB Services that an
employer could ask its employees to voluntarily elect to participate in
employer benefit plans that provide injured employees specified benefits
in lieu of common-law remedies. 230 The court also held the form of
waiver used in this case met the fair-notice and express-negligence tests
for a valid waiver. The court found no statutory bar to such waivers and
observed that the policy arguments raised by various amici were better
addressed by the Legislature. 231
A "jack-of-all-trades" injured during the course of salvage and cleaning
work at a trailer home was injured within the course and scope of his
employment and was thus limited to a remedy under the workers' com-
pensation statute.2 32 His job title of "machinist" was not dispositive,
when considered in the context of all other relevant facts about his work
duties.233
225. Id. at 891-92.
226. Id. at 892.
227. 45 S.W.3d 703, 705 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, no pet. h.) (citing Rodriguez v.
United Van Lines, Inc., 21 S.W.3d 382, 383 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied)).
228. Id. at 706.
229. 52 S.W.3d 807, 812-14 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
230. 44 S.W.3d 544, 554 (Tex. 2001).
231. Id. at 553.
232. Burkett v. Welborn, 42 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
233. Id. at 288.
1304 [Vol. 55
PERSONAL TORTS
In CIGNA Insurance Co. of Texas v. Killion, the court of appeals held
that a trial court erred by not dismissing or abating a bad faith claim
against an insurer, when the insured had not yet exhausted his remedies
before the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission.2 3 4 The trial court
had jurisdiction to grant the plaintiff relief to the extent it was not depen-
dent upon adjudication of a matter within the TWCC's exclusive jurisdic-
tion, but the court could not directly or indirectly adjudicate an issue
within the agency's exclusive jurisdiction. In this case, the issue of the
plaintiff's entitlement to back surgery was within the agency's exclusive
jurisdiction, the agency had yet to address it, and a "large segment" of the
plaintiff's recovery at trial was based upon a favorable ruling as to
whether he was entitled to back surgery.235
In the case of Stephens v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, the trial court
entered summary judgment on a wrongful discharge claim based upon
the Texas Labor Code. 236 DART argued that the wrongful discharge
claim was barred because the plaintiff elected to pursue his claim through
DART's internal grievance and appeal process.2 37 The court of appeals
concluded that the subject matter of the grievance, which dealt with lost
work time, did not address whether DART's reasons for termination
were simply a pretext for discrimination, and thus concluded that the suit
was not barred by the doctrine of election of remedies.2 3 8 The court also
found no res judicata bar because DART was not "a court of competent
jurisdiction," separate facts were involved, and the DART personnel
manual only stated that the administrative decision was "final and bind-
ing," but did not say it was an employee's exclusive remedy.2 39
In the case of Davis v. Medical Evaluation Specialists, the plaintiff sued
a testing company and two physicians, claiming that the medical examina-
tions they performed pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act
were unfairly biased.2 40 The defendants obtained summary judgment on
the basis of immunity. The court concluded that the company was not
entitled to immunity because the company did not itself conduct medical
examinations, and because the act of promoting its physicians to insur-
ance companies is routine commercial activity.24 1 The court held that a
doctor working for a Texas Workers' Compensation Commission lab is
not entitled to absolute derived judicial immunity because that would
give him more immunity than the commissioners who appointed him.242
The court went on to find a fact issue as to whether the physicians had
234. 50 S.W. 3d 17 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).
235. Id. at 22.
236. 50 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (citing TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 451.001 (Vernon 2001)).
237. Id. at 628.
238. Id. at 629 (distinguishing City of Odessa v. Barton, 967 S.W. 2d 834, 835 (Tex.
1998)).
239. Id. at 630-31.
240. 31 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st. Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
241. Id. at 792.
242. Id. (citing TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 402.010).
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acted with the good faith required by the defense of qualified
immunity.243
D. SPOLIATION
The issue of spoliation of evidence was addressed in Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Johnson.244 The plaintiff was injured when a papier mach6 rein-
deer fell on his arm. The actual reindeer was not produced by Wal-Mart
in discovery. The trial court instructed the jury on spoliation. The court
affirmed the instruction, stating that "Wal-Mart reduced the lawsuit to a
swearing match by gathering evidence [the reindeer] and then letting it
disappear. '245 A dissent argued that a retail store ordinarily sells its mer-
chandise and would reverse "[b]ecause I do not believe selling merchan-
dise constitutes an obstruction of justice. '2 46 The Texas Supreme Court
has decided to review this case.
E. CLASS ACTIONS
An illustration of the effect the Texas Supreme Court's ruling in South-
western Refining v. Berna1247 has had on mass-tort personal injury class
action cases is provided by the Fort Worth Court of Appeals' decertifica-
tion in Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Usry.248 In Usry, medical care provid-
ers brought a class action against a needle manufacturer. The trial court
was ordered to adopt a trial plan consistent with Bernal after that case
was issued by the Texas Supreme Court last summer. The plan at issue
ordered that common issues regarding defect, causation, and damages
would be decided by a single jury in a single trial. The class was certified
under Rule 42(b), which requires that questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any individual questions. 249
Acknowledging that suits involving "allegedly defective medical de-
vices may be among the weakest candidates for certification when the
predominant test is rigorously applied in the manner required under
Bernal," the Fort Worth Court of Appeals decertified the class. Specifi-
cally, the court found that individual questions concerning causation and
comparative responsibility predominated over any common issues; for ex-
ample, the class members' injuries occurred in a variety of unique circum-
stances involving the fault of the healthcare workers, their employers,
and also third parties.250 The court of appeals rejected the trial court's
plan for resolving the individual comparative fault issues, which allowed
putative class members to file no-evidence motions for summary judg-
ment on the defendants' comparative fault defense using completed claim
243. Id. at 795.
244. 39 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. granted).
245. Id. at 731-32.
246. Id. at 732 (Gaultney, J., dissenting).
247. 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000).
248. 57 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).
249. Id. at 493 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(4)).
250. Id. at 494.
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forms.2 51 Significant to the court's rejection of this plan, the claim forms
would be the only means of discovery permitted under the plan unless the
trial court granted a specific request for additional discovery. Recogniz-
ing, as did Bernal, that "class actions do not exist in some sort of alterna-
tive universe outside our normal jurisprudence," the court rejected the
plan largely because the right to full and fair discovery would be unfairly
restricted.2 52
F. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
Continuing the difficult task of trying to draw boundaries between
"use" and "non-use," the Texas Supreme Court considered several immu-
nity issues during this Survey period. In Texas Department of Public
Safety v. Petta, the supreme court found that sovereign immunity barred
claims against the Texas Department of Public Safety because the con-
duct complained of was intentional, and immunity is not waived for negli-
gence involving the use, misuse, or non-use of information in instruction
manuals. 253 The plaintiff alleged various intentional torts after she was
found guilty of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer.2 54 The
supreme court, noting that the Texas Tort Claims Act specifically ex-
cludes waiver of sovereign immunity for claims arising out of assault, bat-
tery, or other intentional torts, held that the conduct the plaintiff
complained about was clearly intentional and fell within the Act's exclu-
sion. 255 The court also rejected the plaintiff's claim that the Depart-
ment's negligence in failing to furnish proper training and instruction
manuals waived sovereign immunity because, as the court has determined
before, information is not tangible personal property, and the plaintiff
thus did not allege an injury resulting from the "condition or use of tangi-
ble personal [or real] property. '256
The supreme court also found that sovereign immunity had not been
waived in Texas National Resource Conservation Commission v. White.257
In this case, the court found that a stationary electric motor-driven pump
is considered motor-driven equipment under section 101.021 of the Texas
Tort Claims Act, but that the pump's operation or use did not cause the
plaintiff's property damage. 258 After gas fumes migrated onto the plain-
tiff's property, the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission
("TNRCC") installed a motor-driven pump to dissipate the fumes. A fire
251. Id. at 497.
252. Id. at 497-98.
253. 44 S.W.3d 575, 580-81 (Tex. 2001).
254. Id. at 576-77.
255. Id. at 580 (citing TEX. Civ. PR¢c. & REM. CODE § 101.057).
256. Id. (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(2)).
257. 46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2001).
258. Id. at 869 (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1)(A)). Section
101.021(1)(A) provides, inter alia, that sovereign immunity is waived if property damage is
caused by the wrongful act or negligence of an employee acting within the scope of his




then started, and the plaintiff claimed that section 101.021(1)(A) applied
because her property damage was proximately caused by the TNRCC's
use of motor-driven equipment. Disapproving of Schaefer v. City of San
Antonio,259 the court held that stationary electric motor-driven equip-
ment is within the scope of section 101.021's definition of motor-driven
equipment.260 However, because the fire was not caused by the use of
the pump, but rather arguably by the non-use of the pump, sovereign
immunity was not waived. 261
In another non-use case, the supreme court found that sovereign im-
munity was not waived after doctors failed to diagnose an inmate's men-
ingitis. 262 Despite the plaintiff's contention that the doctors misused
pain-reducing drugs, the court found that a failure to diagnose was the
cause of the injury, not a use of property. In a concurrence, Justice Hecht
noted that the court has attempted to determine the meaning of the word
"use" in the Texas Tort Claims Act in sixteen cases, approximately one
every other year since the Act has been passed, and has produced irrec-
oncilable decisions.2 63 In the end, Justice Hecht stated that because the
common-law rule of immunity in Texas was the judiciary's to recognize, it
is also the judiciary's to disregard. 264 Ultimately, he suggests that an abo-
lition of immunity is more likely to prompt clarity from the
Legislature.2 65
The distinction between use and non-use has also been addressed by
courts of appeals this Survey period. Specifically, in Gainesville Memo-
rial Hospital v. Tomlinson, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a
nurse's failure to use the intercom to call for assistance in helping a pa-
tient to get out of bed amounted to the non-use of property, which has
been rejected as a waiver of immunity. 266 Also, in Baston v. City of Port
Isabel, the court held that an EKG readout was not "information," but
was defined as tangible personal property by an earlier holding of the
Texas Supreme Court.267
In City of San Antonio v. Hernandez, the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals found that immunity was not waived despite allegations that a po-
lice officer misused the police radio to call for backup with a heightened
emergency code.2 68 In Hernandez, police officers confronted a suspect
who drew a pistol and fired. After the emergency radio was used to call
259. 838 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 1992, no writ).
260. White, 46 S.W.3d at 869.
261. Id. at 869.
262. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 588 (Tex. 2001).
263. Id. at 590-91.
264. Id. at 592.
265. Id. at 593.
266. 48 S.W.3d 511, 514 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied).
267. 49 S.W.3d 425,428 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied) (citing UTMB v.
York, 871 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1994), and Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 659 S.W. 30, 33 (Tex.
1983)).




for backup help under a heightened emergency code, the suspect pointed
his gun again, and three of the four officers shot the suspect.269 The suit
alleged that, had the officer not called for a heightened emergency code,
the situation would not have escalated.2 70 Following a long line of cases,
the court found that property does not cause injury if it does no more
than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible, and therefore,
immunity was not waived.271
The same court also held that allegations that an ambulance driver
failed to drive a vehicle "directly and expeditiously," and allegations that
the driver failed to contact an operator by phone as instructed to do in a
guidebook, stated claims arising from "non-use" of property and motor
vehicles, which are not actionable.272
The Harris County Jail uses the services of certain physicians who serve
as independent contractors, and who are employed by the University of
Health Science Center at Houston. This relationship is confirmed in a
written agreement between the County and the hospital. Even though
the County required UT's personnel to comply with the county's security
policies and guidelines, Harris County had no right to control the details
of the physicians' work, and had thus not waived its sovereign immunity
under the Texas Tort Claims Act as to the work of these physicians.273 A
dissent argued that the County had a non-delegable duty to provide med-
ical care for its inmates, thereby making it liable for negligence of physi-
cians who treat inmates.274
Addressing a matter of first impression, the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals held in State v. Kreider that minors are not exempt from the six-
month presuit notice requirement of section 101.101 of the Texas Tort
Claims Act.275 An individual and his two minor daughters were injured
in an accident allegedly caused by a special defect in the road surface.
Although the accident occurred on March 14, 1998, the lawsuit was not
filed until December 28, 1999. The court found that it lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to fully comply with the
provisions of the Act. Significant to the court's holding that minors must
comply with the presuit notice requirement was its finding that the statute
is clear and unambiguous. The Legislature could have expressly provided
for an exception and did not. Also, the purpose of the presuit notice of
claim is to insure prompt reporting of claims so the state may investigate
while facts are fresh, and Texas courts have consistently refused to extend
the notice period for plaintiffs with disability and mental
269. Id. at 406.
270. Id. at 409.
271. Id.
272. Martinez v. VIA Metro. Transit. Auth., 38 S.W.3d 173, 176-77 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2000, no pet.).
273. Thomas v. Harris County, 30 S.W.3d 51, 54 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 2000,
no pet.) (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE §101.001(1)).
274. Id. at 56 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
275. 44 S.W.3d 258, 264 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (citing TEX. Civ.




Following a long line of cases holding that design decisions are discre-
tionary and therefore do not waive immunity under the Texas Tort Claims
Act, the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendant in Ramos v. Texas Department of Public Safety.277 Two children
were killed by a test taker's car when it lurched forward while parking.
The plaintiffs alleged various premises defects, including a failure to have
warning signs or have a designated safe waiting area for children. The
court found that these were discretionary design decisions which did not
waive sovereign immunity.278
The case of City of Fort Worth v. Robels arose when a child was killed
at an intersection controlled by two-way stop signs.279 Immunity is
waived as to "the absence, condition, or malfunction of a traffic or road
sign, signal, or warning device unless the absence, condition, or malfunc-
tion is not corrected by the responsible governmental unit within a rea-
sonable time after notice. ' 280 The court concluded that this waiver only
applies to traffic control signs and signals that were installed, but for
some reason are no longer in place. 281 Immunity was maintained in this
case because the decision to place a traffic signal in the first instance is
discretionary.282 The court went on to hold that, once the municipality
decides to install a particular traffic signal, that decision must be imple-
mented in a reasonable time. Because no evidence showed that the City
had decided to install a light at the time of the accident, the City was
immune from suit.283
In the case of Clark v. University of Houston, the court held that a
police officer's pursuit of a suspect is a discretionary act and thus the
police officer was entitled to official immunity as a defense.284 It is well
settled that an action that involves personal deliberation, decision, and
judgment is discretionary; by contrast, actions that require obedience to
orders or the performance of a duty to which the actor has no choice are
ministerial. 285 The plaintiff argued that, because the police officer was
ordered by his superior to chase the suspect's vehicle, the action was min-
isterial. The court of appeals rejected this theory, noting that Clark is
controlled by City of Lancaster v. Chambers, which directs that "beyond
the initial decision to engage in the chase, a high-speed pursuit involves
276. See id. at 264-65.
277. 35 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
278. Id. at 733.
279. 51 S.W.3d 436 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied).
280. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.060 (A)(2).
281. Robels, 51 S.W.3d at 442 (citing City of San Antonio v. Schneider, 787 S.W.2d 459,
460 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 1990, writ denied)).
282. Id. at 440 (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CO1E § 101.056).
283. Id. at 443 (citing and overruling in part Miller v. City of Fort Worth, 893 S.W.2d 27
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ dism'd by agr.)).
284. 60 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
285. See City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994).
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the officer's discretion on a number of levels. '286
What constitutes a special defect was addressed in Texas Dept. of
Transportation v. Velasco.287 The San Antonio Court of Appeals re-
versed the trial court's denial of the Department of Transportation's plea
to the jurisdiction in this personal injury lawsuit, holding that a stopped
vehicle is neither a premises defect nor a special defect and, conse-
quently, sovereign immunity is not waived.288
An extremely detailed policy implemented by a school to address the
handling of a disturbed and violent child "defined the duties [of school
employees] with such precision as to leave nothing to the exercise of
[their] judgment or discretion. '289 Accordingly, the failure of school dis-
trict employees to lock a door, escort children, and report to the office if
children were late, created fact issues that the employees did not carry
out their ministerial duties, and could allow recovery despite the immu-
nity they might otherwise enjoy. 290
The Austin Court of Appeals concluded that, under the "plain and or-
dinary meaning" of certain provisions of the Texas Health and Safety
Code, 291 a person harmed by a violation of the "patient's bill of rights"
while under the care of a mental health facility may sue the facility for
damages and other relief.292 More specifically, the Texas Board of
Mental Health and Mental Retardation is required by statute to adopt a
"patient's bill of rights" governing in-patient mental health facilities for
the purpose of protecting their patients' health, safety, and rights.293 A
violation of this bill of rights falls within the statutory waiver of immunity
from liability and suit.2 94 The Waco court reached the same result in
Wichita Falls State Hospital v. Taylor,295 as has the Beaumont court.296
The Austin court acknowledged that the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, in
direct conflict with this holding, has recently held that the Code does not
waive sovereign immunity for violation of the patient's bill of rights.297
The difference turns on the court's reading of two Texas Supreme Court
opinions dealing with sovereign immunity issues under the Anti-Retalia-
tion Act 298 and the Workers' Compensation Act,299 as well as the perti-
286. Clark, 60 S.W.3d at 209 (quoting Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 655). Chambers in-
volved a high-speed chase of a motorcyclist and his passenger by numerous police vehicles,
which ultimately ended in the death of the motorcycle driver and injuries to the passenger.
287. 40 S.W.3d 702 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
288. Id. at 704-05.
289. Myers v. Doe, 52 S.W.3d 391, 396 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. filed).
290. Id. at 396-97.
291. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 321.003(a) & (b) (Vernon 2001).
292. Cent. County Ctr. for Mental Health & Mental Retardation Servs. v. Rodriguez,
45 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. filed).
293. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 404.151-.167 (Vernon 2001).
294. Rodriguez, 45 S.W.3d at 711.
295. 48 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. granted).
296. Spindletop MHMR v. Doe, 54 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, no pet.).
297. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Lee, 38 S.W.3d 862, 870
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. filed).
298. City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 292-96 (Tex. 1995).
299. Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 741-43 (Tex. 1980).
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nent legislative history.300 This split among courts of appeals someday
may draw attention from the supreme court.
G. DAMAGES
The case of Columbia Hospital v. Moore addressed two complex dam-
ages issues: (1) whether pre-judgment interest assessed under Subchapter
P of the MLIIA is excluded from the damages cap in the Act, and (2)
whether the damages cap applicable to a single defendant who is jointly
and severally liable may be multiplied by the number of culpable defend-
ants.30 1 The interest issue turned on the language of Subchapter P, which
provides that, notwithstanding the general pre-judgment interest statute,
pre-judgment interest in a healthcare liability claim shall be awarded in
accordance with the Act. 30 2 The Act goes on to require that, if a health-
care liability claim is not settled within a specified period, the judgment
must include pre-judgment interest on past damages found by the trier of
fact. 30 3 The question is whether Subchapter P, enacted in 1995, was in-
tended to exclude pre-judgment interest from the damages cap in Sub-
chapter K of the MLIIA.30 4 Observing that both subchapters use
mandatory language, but that neither contains language of limitation, the
court concluded that Subchapter P controls as the later-enacted stat-
ute.305 Despite a number of policy arguments stated in the supreme
court's opinion in Horizon/CMS Healthcare v. Auld,306 in the final analy-
sis the court of appeals concluded that Auld was expressly limited to the
former statute and that, as the later-enacted statute employs mandatory
language, the legislature's intent in Subchapter P was to exclude interest
from the cap.30 7
As for the application of the damage cap to a jointly and severally lia-
ble defendant, the court held that the cap may not be multiplied by the
number of culpable defendants. It reasoned that the predictability of
damages that the MLIIA was intended to provide would be eroded if a
defendant's joint and several liability was allowed to multiply its cap.30 8
A dissent argued that the pre-judgment interest should be subject to the
cap, arguing that the statutory scheme analyzed in Auld is a useful anal-
ogy, and that the legislative history of Subchapter P suggests that its pur-
300. See Rodriguez, 45 S.W.3d at 712-13.
301. 43 S.W.3d 553, 554 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. granted).
302. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 304.101-.108 ("subchapter P").
303. See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. 2000).
304. Subchapter K provides that in an action on a healthcare liability claim, the limit of
civil liability for damages of a physician or healthcare provider shall be $500,000. TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.02(a)).
305. Moore, 43 S.W.3d at 559 (citing TEX. Gov. CODE ANN. § 311.025(a)).
306. 34 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. 2000).
307. Moore, 43 S.W.3d at 562.
308. Id. at 566 (distinguishing Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Tex., Inc. v. Baber, 672
S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e., 714 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1986)
(per curiam); Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 735 S.W.2d 244, 245 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987), rev'd
in part and affd in part, 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990); and Wynn v. Cohan, 864 S.W.2d 205,
206-07 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied)).
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pose was to bar pre-judgment interest on future damages rather than
create another exception to Subchapter K's damages cap.30 9
The court concluded in Harris County v. Smith that it was error to in-
clude loss of earning capacity as an element in the damages question for a
plaintiff in a negligence case, where no credible evidence showed what his
income would have been without the accident.310 The question was then
whether this error required reversal under Crown Life Insurance v. Cas-
teel on the grounds that the court could not determine whether the jury
awarded damages for elements without evidentiary support in answering
this question. 3H1 The court made a traditional harm analysis, noting that
the issues involved a finding of damage as opposed to Casteel, which ad-
dressed only erroneously submitted liability questions. Under this analy-
sis, the court should consider the error not in isolation, but as part of the
entire charge, and should not vacate an entire award if the jury could
have awarded all damages for a single element.312 The court held that the
charge permitted a "zero" award for certain elements, noting the phrase
"if any" in the prefatory language for each damage question, coupled
with the instruction to consider each element of damages separately. 313
The court then concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a
$90,000 award for other elements of damages.314
The case of Schindler Elevator Corporation v. Anderson provides a
well-detailed summary of sufficient evidence to support a substantial
damage award for future medical expenses, future pain and mental
anguish, and physical impairment and disfigurement.315 Each element
was supported by detailed testimony from the plaintiff, whose foot was
badly injured in an escalator accident, from his family, and from qualified
experts, including a treating orthopedic surgeon, another orthopedic sur-
geon, and a child psychologist. This testimony provided an adequate
foundation for the jury to exercise its "wide discretion in resolving mat-
ters of pain and suffering, disfigurement, impairments and setting the
amounts attributable thereto. '316
309. Id. at 566 (Taft, J., dissenting in part).
310. 66 S.W.3d 326, 330 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. filed) (citing Bon-
ney v. San Antonio Transit Co., 325 S.W.2d 117, 121 (1959)).
311. 22 S.W.3d 378, 389 (Tex. 2000).
312. Smith, 66 S.W.3d at 335 (citing William V. Dorsaneo, Broad-Form Submission of
Jury Questions and the Standard of Review, 46 SMU L. REV. 601, 634-36 (1992)).
313. Id. at 336.
314. Id.
315. No. 14-98-01286-CV, 2001 WL 931177 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no
pet.).
316. Id. at *18.
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